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Abstract
During 1990-2001, only 0.6 per cent of additional global income per capita contributed to reduc-
ing poverty below the $1-a-day line, down from 2.2 per cent during 1981-1990, and barely half 
the poor’s share of global income. Coupled with the constraints on global growth associated with 
climate change, and the disproportionately adverse net impact of climate change on the poor, 
this casts serious doubt on the dominant view that global growth should be the primary means 
of poverty reduction. Rather than growth, policies and the global economic system should focus 
directly on achieving social and environmental objectives.
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of the Beneﬁ  ts and Costs of Global Economic Growth1
David Woodward and Andrew Simms
This paper questions an idea which has become almost unquestionable in mainstream economics—that a 
growing global economy is the indispensable foundation for solving all with regard to reducing poverty. 
The Governments of the world have committed themselves to meeting the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs), the ﬁ  rst of which, MDG1, is to halve the proportion of the population of developing coun-
tries living below the $1-a-day poverty line from its 1990 level by 2015.
How can this best be achieved? The answer, we are told, is growth. Poverty reduction, according 
to the orthodoxy, requires rapid economic growth in developing countries; economic growth in develop-
ing countries in turn requires rapid growth in the global economy; therefore, poverty reduction requires 
the fastest possible growth in the global economy. If this creates environmental problems, conventional 
wisdom puts faith in technology to reduce the damage.
However, the rate of technological improvement is much too slow, given the severity of current 
environmental problems, such as climate change, and their impact, which is greatest on the poorest. This 
appears to give rise to serious tension between the objectives of human development and poverty reduc-
tion, on the one hand, and environmental sustainability, on the other. Is this tension inevitable, however, or 
does the world view underlying it rest on false logic?
The extreme inequality in the global distribution of income and assets seriously undermines the 
effectiveness of global growth in reducing poverty. The corresponding inequality in the use of natural 
resources, particularly energy, is one of the biggest barriers to progress on international environmental 
issues. Based on statistics from the International Energy Agency, the average resident of the United States 
generates as much of the chief greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide, in a single day as someone in China does 
in more than a week, while the average Tanzanian takes about seven months to generate the same amount.
This paper, therefore, considers the extent of the inequality in the distribution of the beneﬁ  ts of 
growth and the possibility of resolving the tensions between human development and environmental ob-
jectives by shifting the focus from growth to income distribution at the global level.
The growth dilemma: poverty reduction versus the environment?
The two greatest challenges facing the global economy are eradicating poverty and achieving environ-
mental sustainability. Even on the basis of World Bank data, 45 per cent of the world’s population—some 
2.8 billion people—live below the “$2-a-day” poverty line; and more than 1.1 billion—more than the total 
population of the developed world—below the “$1-a-day” line.
1  This paper is based on Woodward and Simms (2006), to which readers are referred for more detailed results and 
some additional analysis. Except where otherwise speciﬁ  ed, all poverty data are taken from the World Bank’s 
PovCalNet computational tool, accessible at http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet.2  DESA Working Paper No. 20
Since the $1-a-day line is based on purchasing power parity (PPP), in principle, it represents the 
level of consumption of a single earner in the United Kingdom at the minimum wage, with 36 dependents 
paying tax but receiving no beneﬁ  ts (and in most contexts, with no access to free health care or education) 
(Woodward and Simms, 2006: box 1).
The interquartile range of child mortality rates at the $1-a-day line is one in six to one in twelve, 
and that for the rate of stunting in survivors between one third and one half. In Niger, the under-ﬁ  ve mor-
tality rate at the $1-a-day line is more than one in three (Wagstaff, 2003).
 This compares with an overall 
child mortality rate in developed countries of around one in one hundred and ﬁ  fty. That nearly half the 
world’s population should live in the twenty-ﬁ  rst
 century in such poverty that up to one third of their chil-
dren die before they reach the age of ﬁ  ve, at a time of unprecedented wealth among the world’s rich, can 
only be described as a moral outrage.
If poverty reduction is a moral imperative, resolving our current environmental crises is, in many 
respects, a practical necessity. The concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere has been rising 
steadily since the Industrial Revolution as a direct consequence of burning fossil fuels to power economic 
activity. Emissions have risen dramatically as the global economy has grown over the last few decades 
(see ﬁ  gure 1).
According to UK Prime Minister Tony Blair’s International Climate Change Task Force (2005), 
the growth rate of greenhouse gas concentrations associated with current economic growth rates could, 
within a decade, lead to a level commensurate with environmental feedbacks that, in turn, could make the 
process irreversible.
 Even current levels of warming can seriously undermine the livelihoods of the poor-
est people (Simms, 2005).
Poverty, we are told, can only be reduced through continued—and ideally faster—growth of the 
global economy. This message, often linked with injunctions to follow orthodox economic policies, has 
become a mantra of the international ﬁ  nancial institutions: “No country has achieved the sustained rapid 
growth needed to reduce poverty without opening up its trade with the rest of the world…. Economic 
growth is the principal route to lasting poverty reduction” (Krueger, 2004a); “Of course, the poor have yet 
Sources: Marland and Boden (2005), 
World Bank (2005a).
Figure 1:
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to beneﬁ  t as much [from growth in India] as they—or we—would like.... But the solution is more rapid 
growth—not a switch of emphasis towards more redistribution. Poverty reduction is best achieved through 
making the cake bigger, not by trying to cut it up in a different way” (Krueger, 2004b).
At the same time, however, there are serious and growing concerns about the effects of global 
economic growth on the environment, particularly in terms of climate change, but also with regard to the 
exhaustion of natural resources. Paradoxically, the latter concern applies particularly to oil, whose ris-
ing price undermines the economies of oil-importing poor countries—although our current closeness to 
key climatic thresholds and the plentiful availability of other fossil fuels means that oil depletion will not 
resolve climate change.
Assessing the literature on growth and environmental degradation, the World Bank (2000) concluded 
that “A growing economy imposes even greater demands on natural resources and makes management inter-
ventions crucial.” It is sometimes argued that, beyond a certain point, increasing income turns from worsening 
to improving environmental conditions such as air and water quality. However, relying on this is dangerous 
because “many developing countries cannot reach the turnaround income level for decades”. Moreover, as 
the Bank also observes, any growth rate leads to an absolute depletion of natural resources, such as forestry, 
ﬁ  sheries, soil and the natural capital of coastal regions. Thus “neither rapid nor slow growth is an automatic 
ally of natural capital”, and fast growth especially creates pressure causing a decline in its “quality”.
Who’s costing the earth, and who’s paying the price?
According to the most recent assessment of humanity’s ecological footprint, in 2002, human demands 
on the planet, transmitted through our growth-based economies, exceeded the biosphere’s regenerative 
capacity by more than 20 per cent. While nature can tolerate certain degrees of overexploitation, persistent 
overburdening leads to the collapse of ecosystems and natural resource availability. Diamond (2005) at-
tributes historical collapses of civilizations to human inability to identify the stage at which societies pass 
the ecological point of no return.
Our environmental demands are also very unevenly distributed. The world’s total available bioca-
pacity consists of 11.5 billion hectares of biologically productive space –grassland, cropland, forests, ﬁ  sh-
eries and wetlands. Since there are approximately 6.4 billion people on the planet, this gives an average 
of 1.8 hectares of “environmental space” per person. Europe, on average, requires 4.7 global hectares to 
produce the resources it consumes and absorb the wastes it generates—a ﬁ  gure which has nearly doubled 
since 1961 (Global Footprint Network, 2005).
 Since it only has 2.3 global hectares available per person, 
more than half its footprint effectively falls outside its borders. Based on 2002 data, the ﬁ  gure is even 
higher in the UK (at 5.4 global hectares per person), only slightly lower in Japan and twice as much in the 
US (EEA, forthcoming; Wackernagel and others, 2005).
As the world economy grows, so does its footprint, taking us ever further away from living 
within our environmental means and the target of real sustainability. In per capita terms, the footprint of 
the developed countries has grown much faster than that of the developing countries. The footprint per 
person in the former grew from 3.8 global hectares per person in 1961 to 5.4 in 1981 and 6.4 in 2001—an 
overall increase of 68 per cent. In developing countries, the increase over the same period was just 7 per 
cent—one tenth as much—from 1.4 global hectares per person in 1961 to 1.5 in 2001; the footprint actu-
ally decreased between 1981 and 2001 (Wackernagel and others, 2005; see ﬁ  gure 2).4  DESA Working Paper No. 20
Moreover, increasing consumption in Europe and the US sets an aspirational model for the rest 
of the world to follow. However, for everyone on Earth to live at the current European average level of 
consumption, more than double the bio-capacity actually available would be required—the equivalent of 
2.1 planets the size of our Earth; for everyone to consume at the US rate, ﬁ  ve would be required.
While rich countries are disproportionately causing environmental problems, however, it is the 
poor countries—and especially the poorer people within them—who suffer the most serious consequenc-
es. The problem is one of inverse dynamics: while the poorest receive very little of the beneﬁ  t of global 
growth, as discussed below, they bear a disproportionate share of its costs—for example, the consequenc-
es of global warming.
As a result, the pursuit of poverty reduction through a strategy based primarily on global econom-
ic growth quickly becomes perverse: the already wealthy become both relatively and absolutely wealthier, 
while the poorest both slip further behind economically and have their well-being and prospects further 
undermined by environmental degradation.
The climate barrier
Recent US research has shown that, in the second half of the twentieth century (with some variation), “the 
Sahel, the transition zone between the Saharan desert and the rainforests of Central Africa and the Guin-
ean Coast… experienced a severe drying trend.” The models used by the researchers predict a drier Sahel 
in future, primarily due to human-caused rising greenhouse gas emissions, with “far-ranging implications 
for the economy and ecology of the region” (Held and others, 2005).
 Research from the US National Oce-
anic and Atmospheric Administration describes a 20 per cent drop in rainfall in drought-prone southern 
Africa in the second half of the last century and predicts “much more substantial ongoing drying” (Marty 
Hoerling, quoted in BBC Online (2005)).
The potential consequences of such trends are indicated by recent experiences in the region. 
Since 2001, consecutive dry spells in southern Africa have led to serious food shortages. According to the 
United Nations Ofﬁ  ce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the drought of 2002–2003 resulted 
Source: Global Footprint Network. 
Figure 2:
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in a food deﬁ  cit of 3.3 million tonnes, with an estimated 14.4 million people in need of assistance (IRIN, 
2005).
Globally, natural disasters, most of which are related to the earth’s hydrological cycle and are 
therefore directly affected by climate change, devastate the lives of the poorest people most, according 
to the World Bank Hazard Management Unit. The poor are more likely to occupy dangerous and vulner-
able sites, such as ﬂ  ood plains, river banks, steep slopes and reclaimed land. According to the Red Cross 
World Disasters Report, the frequency and cost of natural disasters will increase due to a combination of 
environmental degradation, climate change, urban population growth and economic globalization (IFRC, 
1999). Of all deaths from natural disasters, 96 per cent occur in developing countries (World Bank, 2004).
No quick ﬁ  x: why technology isn’t the answer
It is clear, therefore, that we need to resolve our environmental crises but that we also have a moral ob-
ligation to eradicate poverty. However, if eradicating poverty requires economic growth, and economic 
growth will make our environmental problems still more insoluble, how can we achieve both? To the 
extent that this question is even asked at present, the answer proposed is to seek a technological ﬁ  x—to 
develop new technologies which will enable us to go on growing by reducing the environmental impact of 
each $1-worth of goods and services we produce and consume.
Globally, real GDP grew at 3.0 per cent per year over the period 1980 to 2001 (World Bank, 
2005a),
 while energy consumption grew at 1.7 per cent per year (EIA, 2004). Although the rates of growth 
differ, the two are clearly linked (ﬁ  gure 1). If the link between growth and rising emissions could be sev-
ered to such an extent that the change in emissions not only slowed substantially but became sufﬁ  ciently 
negative, the clash between growth and global warming could potentially be reconciled. This would 
require a carbon Kuznets curve2 showing greenhouse gas emissions sufﬁ  ciently delinked from global 
economic growth to prevent greenhouse gas concentrations passing about 450 ppmv (parts per million by 
volume) of CO
2 equivalent—the level at which irreversible feedback effects could well occur.
However, there are several reasons to doubt that this scenario is likely or even possible. First, 
there are technical criticisms of the possibility of the neat hill-shaped relationship hypothesized by the 
carbon Kuznets curve, showing income and emissions rising together before emissions drop off (Mül-
ler-Fürstenberger and others, 2004). Second, while economists tend to assume that increases in economic 
growth are limitless, there are strict limits, governed by the laws of thermodynamics, on efﬁ  ciency in-
creases in how we burn fossil fuels.
While fuel efﬁ  ciency has increased substantially over the course of the last century, driven by 
technological development, there are serious questions about how much further it can go. Even in the 
most optimistic scenario—a global political consensus on action, immediate and comprehensive applica-
tion of the most efﬁ  cient technologies available and a massive shift towards the least polluting fossil fuel 
(natural gas)—the result would be a delay of only 24 years in reaching a given higher concentration of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. In a more probable and recognizable political future, with continued 
economic growth, fuel efﬁ  ciency measures could deliver only negligible delays in higher concentrations 
(di Fazio, 2000). As a result, none of the standard International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) scenar-
2  By analogy with the Kuznets hypothesis on the relationship between income inequality and overall income levels 
in the course of development, a Kuznets carbon curve hypothesizes that carbon emissions rise with increasing 
income up to a certain level of income, but decline as income rises beyond this point.6  DESA Working Paper No. 20
ios for the emissions arising from global economic activity show their concentrations being restrained to 
anything like the degree sufﬁ  cient to prevent dangerous human interference in the climate system (Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change, 2001).
Finding the right question
Regardless of how reliable or reckless such technological optimism may be, those who appeal for a purely 
technological solution are asking the wrong question. Development of new technological solutions could 
be pursued equally in contexts of rapid, slow, zero or even negative growth. Rapid growth may generate 
more resources for investment, but it also creates a greater need for those resources to be invested in in-
creasing the volume of production to meet growing demand. This means that its effect on the availability 
of resources for investment in environmentally friendly technologies is ambiguous.
Moreover, given the scale of impending environmental disasters such as global warming, the 
rate at which we are approaching them, the limited scope for resolving them with a purely technological 
approach and the long time lags inevitably entailed, it seems clear that we need both slower growth and 
as much technological progress as we can achieve. Technological improvement is necessary, but alone it 
represents no more than a small step in the right direction. It does not offer a viable solution to the growth 
dilemma.
Growth and poverty reduction: a necessity or a diversion?
If attempts to delink environmental damage from growth do not provide an answer, could delinking pov-
erty reduction from growth then provide a more viable alternative? Because, strange as the proposition 
may sound to economic orthodoxy, poverty can indeed be reduced without growth.
Changes in the incomes of poor households can be seen as a product of two variables: economic 
growth (increasing overall income) and changes in the share of poor households in total income (distribu-
tion of income). It would thus be entirely possible to offset a slower rate of growth—or even a decline in 
total income—by increasing the share of poor households in total income. There is growing recognition 
that distribution is important to poverty reduction as well as growth. For example, Wade (2001) noted that:
“It is remarkable how unconcerned the World Bank, the IMF and other international organisations 
are about these trends [towards increasing polarization of global incomes]. The Bank’s World 
Development Report for 2000 even said that rising income inequality ‘should not be seen as nega-
tive’ if the incomes at the bottom do not fall and the number of people in poverty falls. Such lack 
of attention shows that to call these world organisations is misleading.”
Perhaps stung by such criticisms, the World Bank has recently increased its attention to distribu-
tional issues, devoting its 2006 ﬂ  agship World Development Report 2006 to “equity and development” 
(World Bank, 2005b). However, it insists that “from an equity perspective, the distribution of opportuni-
ties matters more than the distribution of outcomes” (p. 4) and appears concerned with equity primarily 
because (a) “with imperfect markets, inequalities in power and wealth translate into unequal opportu-
nities, leading to wasted productive potential and to an inefﬁ  cient allocation of resources” (p. 7), and 
(b) because “unequal power leads to the formation of institutions that perpetuate inequalities in power, 
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pin long-term growth” (pp. 8–9). In short, while paying lip-service to “intrinsic motives” for promoting 
equity, the Bank’s main concern is with the possibility of inequity undermining economic growth. When 
it comes to substance, there is no sign, as yet, of any concern with equity being translated into changes in 
the economic policies pressed on developing country Governments. Thus, the Epilogue to the 2006 World 
Development Report says “recognizing the importance of equity… implies the need to integrate and ex-
tend existing approaches [to development]” (emphasis added) (World Bank, 2005b: 226).
However, there is a fundamental logical problem in this whole approach. The conceptual separa-
tion of income growth and the income distribution on which it rests assumes, often implicitly, that growth 
and distributional change occur independently of each other, so that growth can be pursued with one set of 
policies, leaving distribution to be adjusted by a separate set of redistributive measures. This is conceptu-
ally incoherent. Economic changes (including policies) act on individual incomes in different ways, ac-
cording to how each person earns and spends his or her income. Average income and income distribution 
are two ways of summarizing the same set of variables—the individual incomes of the population—so, if 
one changes, the other will almost certainly change too. Moreover, how distribution alters will be criti-
cally dependent on the policies implemented in pursuit of growth.
In 2000, the World Bank published a paper by David Dollar and Art Kraay, entitled “Growth 
is Good for the Poor”. This purported to prove statistically that the income of the poor (deﬁ  ned as the 
poorest ﬁ  fth of the population) increased one-for-one with overall income and that standard “pro-growth” 
policies and openness to trade were therefore beneﬁ  cial for the poor. However, the paper—as well as 
subsequent versions (Dollar and Kraay: 2001; 2002)—has been robustly criticized, and its ﬁ  ndings (par-
ticularly on policy and trade openness) are widely seen as discredited by serious ﬂ  aws in methodology, 
compounded by the inevitable problem of data quality (Oxfam, 2000; Weisbrot and others, 2001; Amman 
and others, 2002).
In any case, to investigate the relationship between growth and distribution, or even to make as-
sumptions about it, is to ask the wrong question. The question is not whether growth affects distribution 
(or vice versa), but whether economic policies designed to promote growth affect distribution. The worst 
outcome of all, in terms of poverty reduction, is to pursue policies which sacriﬁ  ce distribution to prioritize 
growth but which in practice fail to generate faster growth. This has been the story of most developing 
countries for most of the last 25 years (Weisbrot and others, 2001).
Ironically, free-market economists are among the ﬁ  rst to assert the existence of a connection, 
albeit a negative one, between growth and policies designed to promote redistribution. For example, they 
argue that tax/transfer-based redistribution measures weaken growth by undermining incentives—even 
though economic theory is ambiguous on this and the evidence is inconclusive (Klasen, 2003). To say that 
policies for redistribution impede growth, however, is inconsistent with asserting that policies to promote 
growth do not affect distribution—particularly as these may include the reversal of policies designed to 
effect redistribution.
Economic growth: the wrong measure
In light of these considerations, there is no fundamental reason to pursue economic growth as a primary 
objective of policy, or indeed, to consider it as the key indicator of economic performance. Economic 
growth does not, in itself, make people’s lives any better or necessarily reﬂ  ect changes in well-being.8  DESA Working Paper No. 20
Generally speaking, growth takes account only of paid work (with some exceptions, notably sub-
sistence agriculture). The exclusion of unpaid work within the home, in particular, is a major distortion: 
though contributing considerably to well-being, it is not considered production. Suppose, for example, 
that Parent A takes a paid job looking after the children of Parent B and in turn pays Parent B the same 
amount to look after his/her children. Both incomes will then add to national income, and to economic 
growth, even though nothing additional is being produced and no one is any better off ﬁ  nancially. Thus 
a shift away from self-reliance generates economic growth without necessarily reﬂ  ecting any increase in 
well-being. In countless, more complex, real-life examples, from household maintenance and decorating 
to cooking and cleaning, this scenario is played out over and over again.
National income accounts do not take account of non-ﬁ  nancial aspects of well-being, such as 
working time, either. Thus if production were increased by 10 per cent as a result of everyone working 10 
per cent longer, people would not be 10 per cent better off, because of the extra time they were working. 
The measured growth rate is the same, however, whether working time is increased or not. Similarly, no 
account is taken of the effects of changes in uncertainty or ﬁ  nancial insecurity. Equally, in the childcare 
example, neither the immediate social and psychological costs of separating young families nor any lon-
ger term effects, e.g., on crime or health, are counted.
National accounts also include defensive consumption, without taking account of the social prob-
lems which give rise to it. Thus, the additional spending required to clean up pollution, to maintain secu-
rity in the face of increasing crime or social unrest or to ensure national defence in response to increasing 
international tensions all add to national income and growth.
Most importantly in the present context, growth calculations take no account of the distribution of 
income. National accounts treat $1 of income identically, whoever receives it. This is clearly unrealistic 
and counter-intuitive: the effect of an additional $100 on the well-being of a household with an income of 
$100 is clearly far greater than for a household with an income of $1 million. As a result, the effect of a 
given change in aggregate income on well-being is critically dependent on whose income is increased.
This means that from a well-being perspective, the incomes of the rich are systematically overval-
ued at the expense of the incomes of the poor. If we set economic growth, rather than well-being, as our 
policy objective, it institutionalizes this serious distortion, so that policies will inevitably result in a lower 
level of well-being than could otherwise be reached by biasing policies towards the worse off.
The myth of “pro-poor growth”
The World Bank has responded to distributional concerns by shifting its language from growth promo-
tion to the promotion of “pro-poor growth”. One might reasonably conclude that this change represents a 
step towards increasing emphasis on poverty reduction and greater efforts to ensure that the poor beneﬁ  t 
more from growth—a rather overdue change of focus given the Bank’s self-proclaimed mission to reduce 
poverty. The term is potentially misleading, however, as the shift in language is greater than the shift in 
the underlying reality. There are two main contenders for the deﬁ  nition of pro-poor growth:
that the percentage increase in the income of the poor should be no less, on average, than that 
of the non-poor—that is, that growth should not be accompanied by a reduction in the income 
share of the poor (Baulch and McCuloch, 1999; Kakwani and Pernia, 2000; White and Ander-
son, 2001); or
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that growth should result in some increase in the incomes of the poor, however small (Raval-
lion and Chen, 2003; Ravallion, 2004; DFID, 2004).
The latter deﬁ  nition makes the term “pro-poor growth” extremely misleading, as it considers eco-
nomic growth that is accompanied by a considerable increase in inequality as pro-poor. For example, to 
deﬁ  ne growth as “pro-poor” when the annual income of the average rich person increases from $10,000 to 
$11,000, while that of the average poor person rises from $100 to $100.01, would seem to render the term 
virtually meaningless.
However, even the ﬁ  rst of the deﬁ  nitions seems unduly lax. At ﬁ  rst sight, it might seem reason-
able to consider growth as “pro-poor” if the incomes of the poor rise at least as much as those of the rich. 
However, the criterion is the percentage change in income, not the absolute change. This means only 
that the share of the poor in the proceeds of growth should be no less than their initial share in income—
which, by deﬁ  nition, is relatively small.
Even in a relatively less unequal society such as the UK, the share of the poorest 10 per cent of 
the population in income—or pro-poor growth—is only 2.8 per cent, while that of the richest 10 per cent 
is 28 per cent—ten times as much (ONS, 2005). This means that, even by the stronger deﬁ  nition, “pro-
poor” growth may beneﬁ  t the richest 10 per cent ten times as much as the poorest 10 per cent. In many 
other countries—the US as well as most developing countries—inequality is much greater, and so, there-
fore, is the pro-rich bias of “pro-poor” growth.
This suggests a serious discrepancy between the rhetoric of pro-poor growth and the reality. This 
arises because the language of pro-poor growth presupposes a growth-focused strategy. As a quantiﬁ  -
able target of policy to be maximized, the increase in the overall incomes of the poor may be appropriate 
(although it would be desirable to temper this, e.g., by taking account of income distribution among the 
poor, effects on non-ﬁ  nancial well-being, etc.). However, the phrase “pro-poor growth” implies that the 
question being asked is how pro- (or anti-) poor a given rate of growth is in a particular context, and this 
deﬁ  nition is entirely incapable of addressing that question.
This raises the question of why the concept of maximizing the increase in the incomes of the poor 
should be termed “pro-poor growth” when it is quite conceivable that it could best be achieved in some 
contexts through policies which entail negative growth, with substantial redistribution. In other words, 
referring to this concept as pro-poor growth (rather than, for example, income poverty reduction) implies, 
quite erroneously, that it necessarily requires growth.
The discrepancy also arises partly because of the implicit assumption that it is only the absolute 
incomes of the poor which matter. Absolute changes in income are undoubtedly much more important at 
the bottom of the global income distribution than they are to the majority of the population of developed 
countries. In the latter case, around 85 per cent of people live above the level at which absolute income 
ceases to affect well-being. Even among the poor, however, the effect of relative incomes (e.g., through ef-
fects on social status and self-worth) may also be signiﬁ  cant.
What increases the importance of relative incomes immeasurably, however, is the very considerable 
cost attached to growth, in a world which is approaching—and may even have reached—certain environmen-
tal constraints. This applies particularly to limits on carbon emissions, which, if transgressed, will rebound 
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most devastatingly on some of the world’s poorest people. In this real-world context, the question of how 
much poverty reduction is achieved relative to overall economic growth becomes a critical consideration.
This is illustrated in table 1 for a selection of developing countries with different levels of income 
per capita and inequality. For the countries with the highest overall income levels—the World Bank upper-
middle-income category—poor householdss account for no more than 3.5 per cent of national income. 
This means that, even if inequality does not increase, it takes between $29 and $125 of economic growth, 
with all the associated environmental costs, to achieve each $1-worth of poverty reduction.
For the middle-income group (the World Bank lower-middle-income category) the share of the 
poor in income is only 3.5–7.5 per cent. In that case, $14–$28 of growth is required per $1 of poverty re-
duction. Even in the poorest and most unequal country in the group, the Central African Republic, where 
more than 80 per cent of the population lives below the $2-a-day poverty line, the poor receive less than 
one quarter of the income or the beneﬁ  ts of growth.
Thus, a third deﬁ  nition of “pro-poor growth” is required:
that the poor should have a greater-than-average share in the additional income generated by 
growth in absolute terms.
Although this represents a better intuitive interpretation of the concept of pro-poor growth, it is 
generally ignored or explicitly discounted as unrealistic, principally because it would require the incomes 
of the poor to grow much faster in percentage terms than those of the rich (White and Anderson, 2001; 
Klasen, 2005).
However, if our objective is to reduce poverty while remaining within environmental constraints, 
this is precisely what we want to measure—how much of the absolute increase in production and con-
sumption associated with growth actually contributes to poverty reduction? Concerning ourselves only 
with the share of the poor in the beneﬁ  ts of growth relative to their already seriously inadequate share in 
income becomes an irrelevance.
￿
Table 1:









$ growth required 
per $ of poverty 
reduction
Low  High  Central  African  Republic  82.5 24.0 4.16 
Low Medium  Cameroon  50.6  9.6  10.38 
Low Low Kyrgyzstan  27.2  12.3  8.10 
Medium High  Namibia  53.9  4.5  22.39 
Medium Medium Philippines  46.9  7.3  13.65 
Medium Low  Ukraine  21.5  3.5  28.45 
High High Botswana  45.0  3.5  28.85 
High Medium  Malaysia  32.1  2.5  39.92 
High Low Latvia  9.2  0.8  124.67 
Sources: Authors’ estimates, based on World Bank (2005a) and PovCalNet.Growth is Failing the Poor: The Unbalanced Distribution ...  11
This logic becomes considerably more compelling if we extend it to the global level. The com-
bination of inequality within countries with the extreme inequality between countries gives rise to a quite 
extraordinary degree of inequality among the population of the world as a whole (see ﬁ  gure 3). In fact 
the world distribution of income is substantially more unequal than even the most unequal country. The 
highest Gini coefﬁ  cient recorded by the World Bank for any country is 74.3 percent, for Namibia in 1993 
(World Bank, 2005a), compared with 80 per cent for the world as a whole (Milanovic, 1999).
In 1993, the poorest 10 per 
cent of the world’s population ac-
counted for just 0.8 per cent of world 
income, compared with 50.8 per cent 
for the richest 10 per cent. The rich-
est 1 per cent alone accounted for 9.5 
per cent, implying an average income 
for this group some 120 times the 
average for the poorest 10 per cent 
(Milanovic, 1999). This means that 
the average beneﬁ  t of global growth 
to someone in the richest 1 per cent 
of the population could be 120 times 
more than that of someone in the 
poorest 10 per cent, and yet it would 
still be considered “pro-poor” even 
by the more progressive of the two 
deﬁ  nitions. This is, to say the least, 
counter-intuitive.
In fact, even this ﬁ  gure understates the scale of the difference. Any increase in global inequality 
since 1993 will have widened the gap still further, as would using market exchange rates. Extrapolating 
the trend from 1988 to 1993 (an annual increase of 2.8 per cent) would increase the ratio to around 170 
in 2006, and the differences between market and PPP exchange rates in low-income countries (typically a 
factor of between 2 and 5 (World Bank 2005a) 3 would increase the ratio by a factor of around 3. Combin-
ing these effects could potentially increase the ratio to around 500.
Comparing growth and poverty reduction
If we line up the population in order of income from the poorest (on the left) to the richest (on the right), 
and measure their incomes, we get a picture such as the curve in ﬁ  gure 4. Superimposing the poverty line, 
the total income of poor households is the shaded area below the curve.
As incomes increase, so the income line rises, as shown in ﬁ  gure 5. Comparing the income of the 
poor as deﬁ  ned in each year is misleading, as the incomes of those who escape poverty will then appear as 
a reduction in the income of the poor. Partly due to the form in which the data are provided by the World 
Bank, we therefore include increases in the incomes of those escaping poverty up to, but not beyond, 
3 The  Gini  efﬁ  cient for the global economy in 1993 was estimated at 80 per cent at market exchange rates, but at 
only 60 per cent at PPP rates (Milanovic, 1999).
Figure 3:
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the poverty line—that is, the shaded 
area in ﬁ  gure 5. By comparing this 
with the total increase in income (the 
total gap between the two lines), we 
can measure how much of the ad-
ditional income generated by eco-
nomic growth contributes to reducing 
poverty.
Growth-led poverty reduction: 
how efﬁ  cient?
Even accepting, for the sake of argu-
ment, the idea that global growth 
could be a viable route to poverty 
reduction, there is a serious question 
about how efﬁ  cient it is in achieving 
this objective. This can be assessed by 
comparing the change in incomes be-
low the poverty line with the increase 
in total global income over the same 
period. The results of this analysis, 
using the methodology outlined 
above, are shown in table 2. (More 
detailed results are shown in Wood-
ward and Simms, 2006: tables 2-4.)
Between 1981 and 2001, 
world GDP (PPP in 1993 prices) 
increased by $18,691 billion. Of this, 
only $786 billion, or 4.2 per cent, 
went to poverty reduction as deﬁ  ned 
by the $2-a-day poverty line—slightly 
less than the share of the poor in GDP 
at the beginning of the period (4.35 
per cent)—even though the poor represented the majority of the world population. These ﬁ  gures are po-
tentially misleading, however, as a substantial part of both the change in GDP and the change in the total 
income of the poor reﬂ  ect the increase in the world population rather than increased output and income 
per person. Adjusting for this reduces the proportion of GDP contributing to poverty reduction slightly 
further to 4.1 per cent.
While the $2-a-day level may be a more realistic, if still very low, deﬁ  nition of poverty, attention 
currently focuses on the $1-a-day line, which provides the basis for MDG1. Almost inevitably, the extent 
of poverty reduction based on the $1-a-day poverty line between 1981 and 2001 was even smaller than 
that below the $2-a-day line, at $278 billion—just 1.5 per cent of GDP. More worryingly, it was also ﬁ  ve 
times further below the share of the poor in GDP in 1981 than on the basis of the $2-a-day line (one sixth 
Figure 4:
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less, as compared with one thirtieth). Again, adjusting for population growth makes the situation sub-
stantially worse, reducing the share of GDP growth contributing to poverty reduction to just 1.3 per cent, 
between one quarter and one third less than the share of the poor in GDP.
To put it another way, of every $100 of growth in income per person in the world as a whole be-
tween 1981 and 2001, just $1.30 contributed to reducing poverty as measured by the $1-a-day line and a 
further $2.80 to reducing poverty between $1-a-day and $2-a-day lines. The remaining $95.90 went to the 
rest of the world population above the $2-a-day line.
Is it getting better?
The 1980s were widely described as “the lost decade for development”, especially for Latin America and 
Africa. Much of the developing world was plagued by the debt crisis; interest rates were exceptionally 
high; commodity export prices collapsed; aid fell ever further below the 0.7 per cent of national income 
level to which developed countries had committed themselves in 1970; and most developing countries 
were going through the most painful initial phase of structural adjustment. It seemed things could hardly 
get worse.
The 1990s should have heralded a much more favourable environment for development. Aid lev-
els were expected to beneﬁ  t from a peace dividend following the end of the cold war; the debt crisis was 
over in most middle-income countries; and debt cancellation was increasingly available for poor coun-
Table 2:
  Changes in total income of poor households
  (billions of dollars at 1993 prices)
“$2-a-day” poverty line “$1-a-day” poverty line




Poverty reduction 786 371 388 278 151 95
Change in GDP 18 691 7 512 11 179 18 691 7 512 11 179
Poverty reduction as 
percentage of GDP 4.21 4.94 3.48 1.49 2.01 0.85
Income of poor as 
percentage of GDP 4.35 4.35 3.94 1.80 1.80 1.18
Ratio of share in 
growth to share in 




Poverty reduction 335 187 148 104 76 28
Change in GDP 8 160 3 443 4 717 8 160 3 443 4 717
Poverty reduction as
percentage of GDP 4.11 5.45 3.13 1.28 2.20 0.60
Income of poor as 
percentage of GDP 4.35 4.35 3.94 1.80 1.80 1.18
Ratio of share in 
growth to share in 
GDP 0.94 1.25 0.80 0.71 1.22 0.51
Source: All ﬁ  gures are calculated from Woodward and Simms (2006: tables 2 and 3).14  DESA Working Paper No. 20
tries. Interest rates had fallen back to more normal levels, and, after a decade of structural adjustment, 
developing countries should have been poised to enjoy the promised economic recovery meant to result 
from their painful sacriﬁ  ces in the 1980s. The World Trade Organization was established in 1993 to create 
the more open international trading system seen as necessary for growth, and the World Bank rediscov-
ered its mission to reduce poverty. Markets were freer and more deregulated, States were smaller, econo-
mies were more open and macroeconomic policies were tighter. All in all, if the mainstream economic 
story is to be believed, the stage was perfectly set for growth-led poverty reduction.
The reality, however, was very different: performance in terms of growth-led poverty reduction 
was much worse in almost every respect in the 1990s than in the 1980s. In PPP terms, global growth actu-
ally fell slightly, from 1.7 per cent per annum in 1981–1990 to 1.6 per cent per annum in 1990–2001 (ﬁ  g-
ure 6). While PPP data are not available prior to 1980, global growth at market exchange rates had already 
slowed down by nearly half, from 3.2 per cent per annum to 1.7 per cent per annum between 1960–1970 
and 1970–1981, slowing further to 1.5 per cent per annum in 1981–1990, and still further to just 1.3 per 
cent per annum in 1990–2001 (World Bank, 2005a).
Worse still, global growth also appears to have become much more anti-poor between the 1980s 
and the 1990s. Based on the $2-a-day poverty line, the proportion of growth contributing to poverty 
reduction fell from nearly 5 per cent in the 1980s to just under 3.5 per cent in the 1990s. This represents 
a decline from one eighth more than the initial share of the poor in GDP to one eighth less. Adjusting for 
population growth further worsens performance in the 1990s and accentuates the deterioration between 
the 1980s and the 1990s. By this measure, the share of poverty reduction in growth fell from 5.5 per cent 
(one quarter more than the share of the poor in initial GDP) to 3.1 per cent (one ﬁ  fth less) (see ﬁ  gures 7 
and 8).
Based on the $1-a-day line, poverty reduction fell still more sharply, from $151 billion (2.0 per 
cent of the increase in GDP) in the 1980s to $95 billion (0.8 per cent) in the 1990s. The latter ﬁ  gure is 
one quarter less than the initial share of the poor in world GDP, compared with one eighth more in the 
1980s. Again, adjusting for population growth makes the picture still worse. The contribution of per capita 
growth to poverty reduction fell from $76 billion to $28 billion—from 2.2 per cent of the population-
Figure 6:
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adjusted increase in GDP to just 0.6 per cent, barely half the initial share of the poor in GDP. This means 
that in the 1990s, it took $166 of global per capita growth, with all the associated environmental costs, to 
achieve just $1 of progress towards MDG1.
Growth and distribution: a comparison
If global growth is an inefﬁ  cient and environmentally dangerous solution to the problem of global pov-
erty, how does changing the distribution of income compare? Redistributing just 1 per cent of the income 
of the richest 20 per cent of the world’s population to the poorest 20 per cent would beneﬁ  t the latter as 
much as distributionally equal growth of around 20 per cent. Even expanding the target group to the poor-
est 50 per cent of the world’s population—equivalent to a poverty line of around $2.50 per day at 1993 
prices—and the source group to 25 per cent (roughly the level at which the well-being literature indicates 
that further increases in income cease to raise well-being), a 1 per cent redistribution is equivalent to eco-
nomic growth of 7.4 per cent. This is more than four times the average 1.7 per cent per capita growth rate 
of global GDP (in PPP terms) since 1981 (Woodward and Simms, 2006).16  DESA Working Paper No. 20
The argument that poverty should or could be tackled through redistribution, rather than growth, 
tends to be dismissed by orthodox economists on the grounds that redistribution is unsustainable. Redistri-
bution, they argue, can only continue for a limited period, as incomes will eventually be equalized, so that 
there is no further scope for redistribution. By contrast, they contend, growth can continue indeﬁ  nitely.
Apart from the fallacy of the contention that growth can be sustained indeﬁ  nitely, a simple 
analysis demonstrates the invalidity of this argument, at least at the global level. The total amount going 
to poverty reduction below the $2-a-day line between 1981 and 2001 (population-adjusted) came to $335 
billion in real PPP terms. Based on the estimated global distribution of income in 1993, the income of the 
richest 10 per cent of the world’s population was $14,543 billion.
This means that the rate of poverty reduction achieved between 1981 and 2001 could have been 
achieved through the redistribution annually of just 0.12 per cent of the income of the richest 10 per cent 
of the world’s population. This rate of transfer could be sustained for 300 years before the world as a 
whole even reached the average level of inequality in European Union countries.
Why growth? The “positive-sum game” fallacy
If growth is so meaningless as an objective and so inefﬁ  cient in reducing poverty, and if it gives rise to 
such serious tensions between poverty reduction and environmental sustainability, why is it so prominent 
in the economics discourse?
Trying to reduce poverty through redistribution of income alone in a no-growth global economy 
is, by its nature, a zero-sum game in terms of its ﬁ  nancial effects. The incomes of the poor can only be in-
creased by the same amount as those of the rich are reduced. Growth, on the other hand, means that there 
is more income available in total, so that the rich can get richer even as the poor get less poor. Moreover, 
since the rich are generally more powerful than the poor (World Bank, 2005b)—globally as well as at the 
country level (Jubilee Research, 2005)—this is seen as presenting a more politically feasible approach 
than redistribution.
However, there are three fundamental problems with this argument. First, looking beyond the 
ﬁ  nancial effects to take account of environmental impacts means that growth is no longer necessarily a 
positive-sum game. Every $1 of growth comes with an environmental price tag, so $1 of extra income 
generated through growth brings less than $1 in actual beneﬁ  ts.
Second, as noted earlier, the beneﬁ  ts associated with an extra $1 of income depend critically on 
who receives it. Thus looking at effects on economic and social rights and well-being—which are objec-
tives in their own right—rather than at ﬁ  nancial effects—which are only a means to an end—redistribution 
is a positive-sum game. By taking $1 away from a millionaire and giving it to a pauper, we have no percep-
tible effect on the rights or well-being of the millionaire, but a much greater effect on the life of the pauper. 
While income may be no higher as a result, well-being and the fulﬁ  lment of rights are improved—without 
necessarily generating additional consumption or production which might have environmental costs.4
Thirdly, the zero-/positive-sum game argument is based on a false dichotomy between growth and 
redistribution—in effect, returning to the conceptual separation between the average level and the distri-
4  While the change in the patterns of consumption and production associated with changes in the distribution of 
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bution of income. In practice, the question is not whether our policy objective should be economic growth 
or no growth, or whether we should or should not take steps to redistribute the income arising from this 
growth. Rather, the question is whether economic policies should aim to maximize total income in the 
hope that poverty will fall as a by-product, or whether they should aim more speciﬁ  cally to increase the 
incomes of poorer households and treat growth (or the lack of it) as a by-product—that is, whether distri-
butional effects should be integrated into the design of economic policies as a whole.
Policy implications
If growth does not offer the prospect of reconciling poverty reduction and environmental sustainability, 
then what is the alternative? While a greater emphasis on redistribution policies as an add-on to growth-
oriented policies would help at the country level, it is insufﬁ  cient to resolve a problem which arises at 
least as much from inequalities between countries as from inequalities within them.
Intercountry inequality has been recognized as a fundamental problem since the colonial era, 
giving rise to the developed country Governments’ 1970 pledge to provide 0.7 per cent of their national 
income in aid. However, this commitment has failed miserably: the shortfall of aid from this target was 
$140 billion in 2004.
World Bank analysis suggests that each extra $1 billion of aid provided by the International De-
velopment Association (IDA) in 1997–1998 lifted 434,000 people permanently out of poverty, as deﬁ  ned 
by the $1-a-day line (Goldin, Rogers and Stern, 2002). On this basis, if all the OECD countries had met 
the 0.7 per cent target in every year since 1970, and the additional aid had had a similar poverty-reduc-
tion effect, this would, in principle, have been sufﬁ  cient to eradicate poverty below the $1-a-day line in 
1999—the very year the MDGs were adopted.
Moreover, despite their failure to deliver more than a fraction of the promised aid, the developed 
country Governments have extracted a considerable price for what they have provided. They have used 
aid to prop up sympathetic, but undemocratic, deeply unpopular and often corrupt Governments, to secure 
policy changes that favour their national and commercial interests at the expense of the population of the 
recipient country and to persuade Governments to sign up to international agreements which bind them 
and their successors to ﬂ  awed policies for the indeﬁ  nite future.
Patronage aid thus confers power on the developed country Governments and international 
institutions like the World Bank and the IMF, thus helping to entrench the inequitable structures of the 
global economic system which underlie the more fundamental problem. It is the products of this power 
imbalance—the continuation of the debt crisis in many of the poorest countries for nearly 25 years, the 
imposition of neo-liberal policies across the developing world, the chronic decline in commodity export 
prices and international trade agreements which lock developing countries into an unbalanced market 
paradigm—which reinforce and exacerbate global income inequality.
The alternative is to move decisively away from the current top-down approach, in which poli-
cies are largely determined at the global level, ostensibly, at least, to promote global growth. Instead, we 
need to move deﬁ  nitively towards a system in which national policies are designed explicitly and directly 
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promote, foster and support such policies, treating growth as a by-product, and putting the interests of the 
poor majority of the world’s population ﬁ  rst. In short, we need to move deﬁ  nitively away from what is, in 
effect, no more than a global variant of the long-discredited idea of “trickle-down” to a concept of income 
“bubbling up” from poverty reduction. This might include the generation of additional resources for de-
velopment at the global level, through, for example:
introducing international taxation (for example, on foreign exchange transactions, air travel 
and transport, fuel, etc.);
assigning countries tradable, revenue-raising entitlements to emit greenhouse gases on a glob-
ally equal per capita basis; and
introducing a new global currency, so that money creation generates new public resources at 
the global level (also limiting the potential for ﬁ  nancial instability arising from irresponsible 
economic policies in the US).
It might also entail international collaboration, for example:
to promote local investment, strengthen public ﬁ  nances and allow more progressive tax sys-
tems, e.g., through coordinated measures to control capital ﬂ  ight, tax havens and tax competi-
tion;
to limit the supply of agricultural commodities produced primarily by developing countries, 
so as to reverse the long-term decline in prices;
to ensure that royalties and other payments from extractive industries reﬂ  ect the full cost of 
natural resource depletion, by increasing transparency and controlling competition between 
countries; and
to focus research and development investment on developing technologies which fulﬁ  l social 
and environmental needs, rather than those which maximize corporate proﬁ  ts.
At the country level, as well as implementation of such collaborative measures, it might mean, for 
example:
using resources generated at the global level and strengthened public ﬁ  nances to provide 
high-quality, free and universal education and basic health services; pensions, child beneﬁ  ts 
and social safety nets; and the infrastructure needed for the development of micro, small and 
medium enterprises;
favouring local suppliers in low-income areas in procurement for these and other public pro-
grammes;
targeting income-generation programmes so that the additional production generated broadly 
matches the increase in demand resulting from the associated poverty reduction (based on 
consumption patterns revealed by household expenditure surveys); and
strengthening agricultural extension programmes, focusing particularly on crops consumed 
locally by low-income consumers (so that the price effects of increased supply will also con-
tribute to poverty reduction as well as the income effects).
Without such changes, it appears extremely unlikely that we can reconcile substantial poverty re-
duction—let alone eradication—with the need for environmental sustainability. However, any signiﬁ  cant 
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a change in the way we think about and discuss economic issues, allowing us to break out of 
the conﬁ  nes of mainstream economic discourse; and
a shift in power relations, both globally and nationally, to move power from developed coun-
tries, elites and commercial interests to the majority of the world’s population who still live 
on less than $2.50 per day (at 1993 PPP).
Conclusion
We have, in recent years, become ﬁ  xated on economic growth. This is partly just one component of a 
broader ﬁ  xation on the macroeconomy and partly a result of the tyranny of numbers—a growing obses-
sion with quantiﬁ  able indicators of policy performance and a failure to make what is important measur-
able, rather than making what is measurable important.
It is also partly a product of political pragmatism, on the grounds that the rich are too powerful 
to allow redistribution of their income or wealth. While this may have some justiﬁ  cation, it is noteworthy 
that the economists, politicians and opinion makers who express this view are themselves among the elite 
to which they ascribe such power—and not generally at the forefront of efforts to rectify the imbalance of 
power at the global level. It is difﬁ  cult to escape the conclusion that there is more than a little self-interest 
in such arguments.
More generally, the pro-growth view is critically dependent upon a number of implausible or 
counter-intuitive assumptions: that it is aggregate income that matters, rather than people’s quality of life; 
that growth and distribution are separable, both conceptually and practically; that economic growth has 
no unmanageable environmental costs; and that power relations are immutably ﬁ  xed. In other words, this 
view is critically dependent on the mindset of orthodox economics.
Our analysis indicates that global economic growth is an extremely inefﬁ  cient and environmen-
tally dangerous way of achieving poverty reduction—particularly MDG1—and is becoming even more 
so. Between 1990 and 2001, for every $100 worth of growth in the world’s income per person, just $0.60 
contributed to reducing poverty below the $1-a-day line, 73 per cent less even than in the lost decade for 
development, the 1980s. Each $1 of poverty reduction thus requires $166 of additional global production 
and consumption, with all its associated environmental impacts which adversely affect the poorest most.
This suggests that reconciling the objectives of poverty reduction and environmental sustain-
ability requires a decisive shift away from the blind pursuit of global economic growth and the fallacious 
economic orthodoxy and grossly skewed global governance structures which underlie it. In effect, the 
global growth model amounts to sacriﬁ  cing the environment on which we all depend for our very survival 
to give yet more to those who already have too much, in the hope that a few more crumbs will fall from 
the rich man’s table. The scale of growth this model would require to eradicate poverty—surely our ulti-
mate goal—would generate unsupportable environmental costs, which would fall disproportionately and 
counterproductively on the poorest, rendering the process self-defeating.
In the growth debate, for all its theoretical sophistry, orthodox economics repeatedly falls back on 
a few tried and tested metaphors to defend its growth obsession—that a rising tide lifts all boats, or that 
it is better to bake a larger cake than to cut the existing one more equally. Ironically, however, sea levels 
really are rising, as a result of the global warming driven by economic growth itself, and millions of the 
￿
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poor have no boats to rise in, literally or metaphorically. As for the cake analogy, even the massed ranks 
of orthodox economists have yet to ﬁ  nd either the recipe or the ingredients to bake a spare planet to share 
among the world’s population.
If we are serious about increasing well-being and eradicating poverty within our environmental 
constraints, then it is our progress towards doing so, not growth of aggregate income, for which we should 
design our economic policies and institutions and by which we should judge our progress. This means 
designing national policies to achieve our ultimate social and environmental objectives and changing the 
global economic system, not only to accommodate, but to foster and promote, these policies. Maximizing 
economic growth, and hoping that we will make some progress towards our ultimate objectives as a by-
product, has not, will not, and cannot work.
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